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ARTICLE 
u.s. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
UNDER G. W. BUSH 
ARMIN ROSENCRANZ· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the fIrst three months of 2001, there were two star-
tling developments in climate change policy. In January, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (lPCC) reported 
unequivocally that the world's climate is warming and that 
anthropogenic sources - mostly burning coal, oil and gas to 
produce electricity - are at least partially responsible l • In 
March, his second month as U.S. President, George W. Bush 
both reversed his earlier position on regulating domestic emis-
sions of C02 and repudiated the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. The 
Kyoto Protocol was fashioned at the third Conference of Parties 
(COP) to the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC), held in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997. Its purpose 
was to implement the goals of the FCCC and had been a signal 
accomplishment of the Clinton-Gore administration. President 
Clinton signed it in 1998.2 
There is no way to reconcile these two developments. The 
IPCC 2001 report offered the considered assessment of the 
AB, Princeton; JD, PhD, Stanford; Consulting Professor, Stanford University; 
Adjunct Professor of Law, Golden Gate University; Co-editor (with Stephen Schneider 
and John-O. Niles) of Climate Change Policy: A Survey (Island Press, 2002). 
1 IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) Synthesis Report (Apr. 2001) at 
http://www.ipcc.chl. 
2 Shardul Agrawala and Steinar Andresen, U.S. Climate Policy: Evolution and 
Future Prospects, ENERGY AND ENv'T, Summer 2001, at 126. 
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overwhelming majority of the world's climate scientists, and 
President George W. Bush's reversal and repudiation seemed a 
head-in-the-sand response driven by ignorance, short-
sightedness and the interests of certain elements of the Ameri-
can business community. 
In this short article, I review the development of U.S. cli-
mate change and energy policy under President George W. 
Bush, describe various executive branch initiatives to address 
the issue of global climate change, and assess the prospects for 
progressive U.S. action to address climate change over the re-
mainder of the Bush Presidency. This is a short article because 
the repudiation of Kyoto speaks for itself and the domestic ini-
tiatives that could arguably influence greenhouse gas abate-
ment seem extraordinarily modest in scope and cost. 
II. COP-6 AT THE HAGUE 
Between COP-4 in Buenos Aires in November 1998 and 
COP-6 in The Hague in November 2000, significant domestic 
opposition to emission cuts developed in corporate circles and 
in Congress. Since it became clear that an emissions trading 
system would take many years to be realized, the only alterna-
tive to lifestyle-changing cuts in carbon emissions was for U.S. 
negotiators at COP-6 to seek credits for carbon sinks in U.S. 
agriculture and forestry practices. 3 The European Union (E. U.) 
insisted that at least half of industrialized countries' reduction 
3 [d. at 123. David Sandalow, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Environ-
ment and Science, and Head of the U.S. delegation at COP-6 in The Hague, said in his 
opening statement to the Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Hague, The Netherlands, November 
13,2000: 
The United States will work with all Parties to craft sound decisions that in-
clude: 
• Strong, market-based rules for the flexible mechanisms; 
• Binding legal consequences for failure to meet targets; 
• Rules that recognize the role of forest and farmlands in fighting climate 
change; 
• A prompt start to the Clean Development Mechanism, with rules to ensure its 
workable operation and environmental integrity; 
• Help to provide the technology and capacity [that] developing countries need 
to combat climatic change and adapt to its impacts. 
[Emphasis added) (speech on file with the author). See also D.B Sandalow and I.A. 
Bowles, Climate Change: Fundamentals of Treaty-making on Climate Change, SCI., 
June 8, 2001, at 1839-40. 
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targets be achieved through domestic cuts in fossil fuel emis-
sions.4 It seemed at one point in the negotiations that the gap 
between the E.U and U.S. positions could be bridged. But the 
E.u. delegates, perhaps under pressure from their Green Party 
members and environmental Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), eventually refused to bridge this gap and COP-6 ended 
without agreement. Since George W. Bush was declared presi-
dent-elect in the three weeks following the end of COP-6, it 
seemed to many observers that the gap between the E.U. and 
the U.S. would likely widen in the future. 5 
III. THE GEORGE W. BUSH FIRST HUNDRED DAYS 
The historical moment seemed ripe for Republican presi-
dential leadership, in the tradition of President Nixon going to 
China: Vice President Gore, who championed the "global warm-
ing" issue in his 1992 bestseller, Earth in the Balance, and who 
had been the lightning rod for congressional opposition to car-
bon abatement since 1993, was off the public stage, and Repub-
licans seemed poised to co-opt this issue and divide his sup-
porters. Several industry leaders, including CEOs of oil com-
panies, had announced that global climate change was here to 
stay and needed to be taken seriously. Several large corpora-
tions' reluctant to appear regressive on the issue of climate 
change, had left the Global Climate Coalition - the industry 
lobby that had been so vocal in opposition to an international 
climate agreement for most of the 1990s. The IPCC had just 
predicted a global temperature rise as high as 60 C in the 21 at 
Century unless greenhouse gas emissions are reduced. Seizing 
the moment to announce progressive, market-based carbon di-
oxide policies would seem to have been the safest political 
course, with the possibility of reducing the usual swing to the 
opposition party in the 2002 midterms elections, and helping to 
secure President Bush's reelection in 2004. 
• See Hotting Up in The Hague, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2000, at 83. 
5 Argwala, supra note 2, at124. Beyond these EU/uS divisions, Agrawala and 
Andresen argue that American "national culture" influences the shape of climate 
change policy: "There is unlikely to be domestic support for measures that seemingly 
enhance government control over citizen behavior. This sentiment has played a major 
role in the U.S. insistence on flexible, market based approaches, as opposed to more 
top-down measures ... supported by most European countries." [d. at 133. 
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Notwithstanding this apparent opportunity, President 
Bush wrote on March 13, 2001 to four Republican Senators 
that he was not willing to regulate C02 emissions in light of the 
ongoing California energy shortage and "the incomplete state of 
scientific knowledge of the causes of, and solutions to, global 
warming change, and the lack of commercially available tech-
nologies for removing and storing carbon dioxide."6 
Sixteen days later, the second shoe dropped when Presi-
dent Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol by stating he would 
not accept a plan that will harm our economy and hurt Ameri-
can workers. 7 
IV. REACTION TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S MARCH, 2001 
PRONOUNCEMENTS 
Most environmental NGOs deplored President Bush's 
March 2001 pronouncements on global climate change. One 
typical response came from the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(UCS): 
The president cited two reasons for his decision, both of which 
are ill founded, and without merit. 
The first is that he does not believe the evidence of global 
warming is clear. Nothing could be further from the truth. A 
panel of the world's leading scientists recently released the 
most comprehensive study ever on global warming, and found 
that it is well underway, will have devastating impacts if 
emissions go unchecked, and can be limited at little or no net 
economic cost. 
The second is that including caps on carbon dioxide emissions 
will significantly increase electricity costs for the nation's 
consumers. His claim is based on a fatally flawed study 
commissioned by former Representative David McIntosh, a 
hard-line opponent of action on global warming. Other recent 
analyses by the Department of Energy, Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and private groups demonstrate that major 
• Letter from President George W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and 
Roberts (Mar. 13, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov Inewslrleasesl2001/03 
120010314.html. 
7 President George W. Bush, Press briefing at The White House (Mar. 29, 2001). 
See also Rage Over Global Warming, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2001, at 18. 
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reductions in power plants' pollutants including carbon diox-
ide can be achieved at modest cost.8 
The DCS e-mail to its supporters goes on to explore "solu-
tions to deflate soaring electricity prices," including presiden-
tial support of clean energy sources and energy efficiency 
measures to reduce demand. DCS noted that wind energy is 
the fastest growing energy supply in the world. 9 It is hard to 
comprehend President Bush's political strategy in these March 
2001 reversals. Whereas conservatives and the business com-
munity make up perhaps 20 percent of the electorate,10 polls 
indicate that a large majority of Americans of both major par-
ties consistently favor protecting the environment and conserv-
ing open spaces. l1 Conservatives and business people may be 
more deeply committed to their beliefs than environmentally-
minded people are to theirs, but the political calculations of the 
Bush team still seem to risk a backlash from voters in 2002 
and 2004. 
To defuse the negative public reaction to his reputation of 
Kyoto, as well as his apparent reneging on a campaign pledge 
to regulate C02 emissions, President Bush on May 11, 2001, 
called for guidance on climate change policy from America's 
most highly regarded scientific body, the politically neutral Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (NAS).12 The NAS organized an 
expert panel that, within four weeks, concluded, "[g]reenhouse 
gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of 
human activities ... Human-induced warming and associated 
sea level rises are expected to continue throughout the 2pt 
Century."13 The NAS expert committee went on to endorse the 
IPCC January 2001 report's main conclusions, and praised 
IPCC Working GrouP's "admirable summary of research activi-
8 E-mail from Lloyd Ritter, Union of Concerned Scientists, to the Union of Con-
cerned Scientists mailing list (Mar. 20, 2001) (on file with author). 
• Id. 
ID To be sure, this twenty percent of the electorate may represent eighty percent or 
more of the country's wealth. 
II Jean Cumming & John Harwood, Arsenic Issue May Poison Bush's 'Compassion-
ate Conservatism', WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at 16. In an April 2001 CBS poll, 61 
percent of respondents said that protecting the environment was more important to 
them than producing energy. Id. Only 29 percent chose energy over the environment. 
Id. 
12 Burning Bush, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 16,2001, at 77. 
13 Id. 
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ties in climate science."14 If President Bush expected the NAS 
group to be skeptical of climate change and to hamletize about 
scientific uncertainty, he must have been disappointed. 
Besides calling for help from the NAS, President Bush an-
nounced his intentions to set up a U.S. Climate Change Re-
search Initiative to study areas of scientific uncertainty and 
develop priority areas for investment. 15 He also announced his 
support for a National Climate Change Technology Initiative 
centered in universities and national laboratories.16 These ini-
tiatives got President Bush little credit, especially since they 
appear likely to be modestly funded - as have all U.S. climate 
change initiatives in the last ten years. 
V. KyOTO REDUX 
Stanford Senior Fellow David Victor has argued that the 
Kyoto targets were arbitrary and hopelessly unrealistic."17 The 
Economist believes that Bush's formal repudiation of Kyoto 
contains some good news and some bad news. IS The bad news 
is that (a) President Bush has retrogressed by alleging contin-
ued uncertainties about the science of climate change, in the 
face of an overwhelming consensus among climate scientists 
that global warming and its damaging effects are real and are 
caused by human activity; and (b) President Bush's team has 
argued that developing countries are not required to cut carbon 
emissions and thus get a free ride while developed countries 
like the U.S. suffer economic 10ss,19 But developing countries' 
per capita carbon emissions are now a small fraction of per cap-
ita emissions in the U.S. and other developed countries; the 
developed countries' emissions account for the bulk of the 
greenhouse effect, so it is fair that they act first; and all climate 
negotiations envision a carbon emission role for developing 
countries at a later stage.20 
The good news, according to The Economist, is that the 
Bush people are focusing on the costs of complying with Kyoto 
14 [d. 
to President George W. Bush, Press Briefing at the White House (Jun. 11, 2001). 
16 [d. 
17 VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, 27-29 (2001). 
18 See Oh no, Kyoto, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 7,2001, at 73-75. 
19 [d. at 74. 
20 [d. 
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targets. An international climate change treaty could be im-
plemented in a flexible way that gives broad play to market 
forces and encourages innovation and development of clean 
technologies. Europeans seem to be unreasonably skeptical of 
market approaches, and the Bush repudiation may get them to 
rethink their position. The Economist cited with approval Vic-
tor's argument that the cause of the Kyoto Protocol's collapse is 
its "cap and trade system," which allows ambitious targets but 
puts no limits on compliance costS.21 
VI. THE DOMESTIC POLICIES: BUSH-CHENEY ENERGY PLAN 
Both President Bush and Vice President Cheney are for-
mer Texas oil men. That seems about as good an explanation 
as any for the regressiveness of their "energy security" plan. 
According to the National Energy Policy, the federal govern-
ment can reduce fossil fuel use, improve energy efficiency, de-
velop renewable energy supplies, reduce gasoline consumption 
in the U.S. transportation sector - half of the U.S. oil supply 
from all sources is consumed by vehicles - and switch from coal 
or oil to natural gas without building a diversified energy Sys-
tem.22 
The Bush-Cheney energy plan only addresses the last of 
these five strategies. It focuses on expanding the supply of 
natural gas. There may have been an unsavory connection be-
tween Vice President Cheney and Enron, which had been the 
world's largest natural gas supplier until it filed for bankruptcy 
in October 2001.23 Enron was a top contributor to the Bush-
Cheney campaign in 2000. The plan would open one to two 
mostly gas-fired power plants each week for several years, and 
make the U.S. far more dependent on natural gas than it ever 
was on oil.24 
It seems fairly clear that Bush and Cheney are serving 
their own business community. The suggestion that more drill-
ing within the U.S. will reduce America's dependence on for-
21 [d. at 75. 
22 OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REpORT OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT GROUP, (May 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/. 
23 Tom Hamburger, Six Meetings Cited Between Enron Corporation and Officials of 
the Bush Energy Task Force, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9,2002, at A4 . 
.. Antonia v. Herzog et al., Renewable Energy: A Viable Choice, ENV'T, Dec. 2001, 
at 12. 
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eign oil is bogus. Saudi Arabia has enormous resources of oil 
that can be extracted at a lower cost than oil anywhere else in 
the world. This oil will, inevitably, flow onto the world market 
and set the world price, regardless of U.S. policies.25 
The Bush-Cheney energy plan would open federal lands, 
including Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, to oil and 
gas exploration. It would promote the construction of oil refin-
eries, power plants and oil and gas pipelines. It calls for subsi-
dies for coal and nuclear power and for rolling back environ-
mental standards.26 It is hard to see how any of this promotes 
energy security or serves the national interest. 
VII. OTHER U.S. DOMESTIC ACTIONS AND PROPOSALS WITH 
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS 
On January 9, 2002, the Bush administration announced 
that it was abandoning the Clinton administration's Partner-
ship for a New Generation of Vehicles, on which the govern-
ment has spent an annual average of $200 million over the past 
seven years. This program sought to create an 80-mile-per-
gallon American car. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said 
that U.S. car manufacturers could not build such a vehicle at 
an affordable cost27 - despite the presence in the U.S. market of 
Honda and Toyota hybrid (gasoline and electric-powered) cars 
with mileage per gallon approaching the 80 m.p.g. target. 
Abraham announced a new program called Freedom Coopera-
tive Automatic Research ("Freedom Car") whose aim is to de-
velop sport utility vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells. 28 
The Bush administration seems to have no interest in tougher 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, much less 
in reducing overall motor vehicle use. It seems to prefer to cut 
sweetheart deals with the U.S. auto industry - continuing the 
Clinton Policy in that respect, but with a supposedly more real-
istic goal that, in Secretary Abraham's words, doesn't sacrifice 
"freedom of mobility and freedom of choice."29 
.. See Addicted to Oil, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at 9. 
,. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Regulators Urge Easing of Rules for Clean Air, N. Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at AI. 
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If the U.S. is to seriously embrace hydrogen fuel cells, the 
challenges of hydrogen storage and distribution will have to be 
met. The low energy density of gaseous hydrogen makes it dif-
ficult to store in a vehicle. If hydrogen is to be used to power 
vehicles, it must be stored either as a compressed gas or as a 
liquid at extremely cold temperatures (-253°C). These extreme 
temperature and pressure conditions mean that hydrogen will 
require a new distributional infrastructure. Also, the costs of 
storing cold liquefied hydrogen are currently prohibitively 
high.30 
Four senators last year proposed a modest bill that would 
mandate that the fuel economy of light trucks match car fuel 
economy by 2007.31 Democrats Dianne Feinstein of California, 
Jack Reed of Rhode Island, and Charles Schumer of New York, 
and republicans Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins of Maine 
sponsored this bill. The proposed increase in fuel economy 
would supposedly save an estimated million barrels of oil per 
day and prevent 240 million tons of carbon dioxide from enter-
ing the atmosphere.32 This bill seems to have been eclipsed by 
the war on terrorism and has gone nowhere. 
Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-CT.) and John McCain (R-
AZ.) also announced last August their intention to introduce 
domestic cap-and-rule legislation, which "will ... enable us to 
negotiate an acceptable international agreement ... when the 
U.S. does come back to the table."33 Lieberman chairs the Sen-
ate Governmental Mfairs Committee, which voted out a bill on 
August 1, 2001, to create a new White House Office on Climate 
Change, responsible for developing, coordinating and imple-
menting a national strategy on global climate change.34 
At about the same time, The Washington Post reported 
that executives of several large utilities believe that carbon 
30 Seth Dunn, Hydrogen Futures, Toward a Sustainable Energy System, 
WORLDWATCH PAPER 157, Aug. 2001, at 36-37. 
3. Senators Feinstein and Snowe, release to the press, May 1, 2001, available at 
http://feinstein.senate.goy/releasesOllcafe_standards.html. 
32 [d. 
33 Senators Leiberman and McCain, press statement, Aug. 3, 2001, available at 
http://www.senate.goY/-liebermanlpresslO 1I0S/200 1S03920.html. 
34 Senator Leiberman, press statement, Aug. 1, 2001, available at http://www. sen-
ate.goY/-gOY _affairs/OSO 10 l_press.htm. 
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dioxide regulation is inevitable. They want and need to be 
guided by clear national regulatory policy on C02 emissions.35 
In the wake of COP-7's endorsement of Kyoto's targets, the 
Economist reported on two initiatives by business lobbies. The 
GHG Protocol, developed by the World Resources Institute and 
the World Business Council on Sustainable Development -
whose members include Ford and Dupont - establishes an 
international standard under which businesses report their 
GHG emissions.36 The Emissions Market Development Group 
announced its intention to create a new "commodity for inter-
national trading of greenhouse-gas reductions."37 
The Pew Center on Global Change has also organized a 
"Business Environmental Leadership Council," whose members 
include IBM, Boeing, BP, Hewlett/Packard, Dupont and InteL 
This Council argues that U.S. businesses should take concrete 
steps now to reduce carbon emissions. 38 
VIII. THE FEBRUARY, 2002 BUSH CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGY 
On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced his long 
awaited strategy to address climate change. His target is to 
cut the rate of annual domestic carbon emissions through vol-
untary corporate action from 183 metric tons per million dol-
lars of GDP to 151 metric tones by 2012.39 His aim is to slow 
the growth of emissions rather than reducing them - thereby 
avoiding harm to the U.S. economy. He talked of cutting 
greenhouse gas "intensity" by eighteen percent over the next 
decade. The eighteen percent cut is not a cut in emissions but 
rather a cut in the level of emissions per unit of economic out-
put.40 Growth in economic output between 2002 and 2012 make 
it likely that U.S. carbon emissions would be significantly 
higher in 2012 than they are today. 
,. Eric Pianin, Bush Urged to Negotiate Global Warming Treaty, WASH. POST, Aug. 
2, 2001, at A14. 
36 Gasometry, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17,2001, at 69. 
37 Id. 
36 Business Environmental Leadership Council, mission statement <http://www. 
pewclimate.org/beldindex.cfm >. See also Geoff Winestock, Effort to Cut Greenhouse 
Gases Percolates on Back Burner, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at A14. 
39 John J. Fialka, Bush to Unveil Plan Linking Economy and Environment, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at A22. 
'" Blowing Smoke, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16,2002, at 27. 
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The Bush climate change strategy included a proposed $4.6 
billion in tax credits over five years, averaging $900 million per 
year, to stimulate investments in clean energy sources, hybrid 
and fuel cell vehicles and emissions reducing technologies.41 
Notwithstanding much talk by Bush administration officials 
and the Council of Economic Advisers about market based ini-
tiatives, there is nothing in the new strategy about carbon 
emissions trading - one of the flexibility mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol contributed by the U.S. delegation to COP-3 in 
1997. 
The President said his 2003 budget commits $4.5 billion to 
climatic change, "more than any other nation's commitment in 
the entire world."42 This includes $588 million toward energy 
conservation research and development (R + D), $408 toward 
renewable energy R + D,and $150 million for the new Depart-
ment of Energy "Freedom Car Initiative." 43 
President Bush observed that, under the Kyoto Protocol, 
the U.S. would have had to "make deep and immediate cuts in 
our economy to meet an arbitrary target." It would have cost 
our economy up to $400 billion and we would have lost 4.9 mil-
lion jobs."44 He also noted that "developing countries such as 
China and India already account for a majority of the world's 
greenhouse gas emissions,"45 but failed to acknowledge that 
China and India together contain 2.3 billion people and produce 
fewer carbon emissions than the U.S. with 280 million people. 
President Bush's budget allocations to address climate 
change are on the same order and roughly the same tiny per-
centage of GDP that President Clinton allocated. Like the 
Bush-Cheney energy policy, there is scant emphasis in the new 
climate change strategy on energy conservation, renewable en-
ergy or fuel efficiency standards. An editorial in the New York 
Times concluded that President Bush does not regard global 
warming as a problem: "[t]here seems no other way to interpret 
a policy that would actually increase the gases responsible for 
.. President George W. Bush, Address at The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, (Feb. 14, 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/20021 
02l20020214-5.html. 
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heating the earth's atmosphere ... By his own figures, actual 
emissions ... could rise by 14 percent, which is exactly the rate 
at which they have been rising for the last 10 years."46 
Senator James Jeffords (Ind., VT), chair of the Senate En-
vironment and Public Works Committee, described the Bush 
climate change strategy as "divorced from the reality of global 
warming".47 Environmentalists must now appeal to Congress, 
where they seek legislation to require corporations to publicly 
disclose their carbon emissions - in contrast to the voluntary 
disclosure advocated by President Bush. 
IX. PROGNOSIS 
The declaration that the Kyoto Protocol is dead seems 
premature, in light of its adoption by 178 nations in Bonn in 
July 2001 and reaffirmed at COP-7 in Marrakech in November 
2001. Benefiting from the international shock over President 
Bush's withdrawal from the Kyoto negotiating process, the 
E.U. went along with massive compromises in November 2001 
(COP-7) that they wouldn't consider in November 2000, at 
COP-6. In the wake of Bush's repudiation, the E.U. was will-
ing to accept a partial deal rather than a continued stalemate. 
Thus, U.S. policy has had a major, though obviously unin-
tended, influence over the entire climate change negotiation. 
Prior to September 11, 2001, pressure was building on all 
sides - Congress, industry and environmental groups - to 
take action on climate change and to develop an international 
alternative to Kyoto. Now, notwithstanding the war on terror-
ism, the rest of the world has moved forward with concerted 
international action on climate change without U.S. involve-
ment. Americas' allies may reasonably expect a less unilat-
eral48 and more cooperative role in climate change in view of 
their support of U.S. anti-terrorism measures. 
President Bush may have calculated that responding to in-
ternational pressure on the climate change issue will lose 
rather than gain him domestic support. The major challenge 
'" Backward on Global Warming, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2002, at A18 . 
., Bush Plan Deepens Divide Over Kyoto Protocol, NATURE, Feb 21, 2002, at 82l. 
'" Climate change isn't the only case of unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. In the 
last year, the Bush administration also revoked President Clinton's endorsement of the 
International Criminal Court and cast aside the nuclear test ban treaty. 
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ahead seems to be for Congress and the business community to 
persuade the Bush administration to act much more forcefully 
to reduce carbon dioxide domestically and to collaborate in 
shaping carbon reduction policies, strategies, and mechanisms 
with fellow member states of the FCCC, all sharing the same 
carbon-loaded atmosphere, and most allied with the United 
States in its war on terrorism. This, together with flexible 
market-based mechanisms developed in tandem with Bush pol-
icy advisors, and with growing pressure from Democrats, scien-
tists, and environmentalists, could bring the U.S. back into the 
process. 
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